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Abstract: 
An award of damages in lieu of an injunction can have vast and far-reaching consequences. 
It can undermine legal rights by permitting an offensive activity.. On the other hand, that 
activity may benefit society through employment or public utility, and awarding damages 
in lieu would allow society to be better off than if an injunction was awarded.  
 
For over a century, the court's discretion to award damages in lieu was restricted in Shelfer 
v City of London Electric. The UK Supreme Court in Lawrence v Fen Tigers did away with 
the restrictions around the discretion, opening up the area to an endless range of 
considerations. This essay examines the position of damages in lieu in New Zealand.  A 
range of different jurisdictions are examined, leading to the conclusion that New Zealand 
will adopt that law shift in Fen Tigers. A range of non-exclusive considerations are 
formulated. Finally, the quantum of a damages in lieu award is examined with reference to 
'wrongful use' damages. 
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I Introduction 
In Civil Remedies in New Zealand, Sir Peter Blanchard observed:1 
How many times is a case won on liability but lost on remedy because a legal advisor 
has given no or inadequate thought to where the finding of liability might lead? 
Unfortunately, all too often. 
Before the UK Supreme Court case of Lawrence v Fen Tigers, damages in lieu of an 
injunction were only awarded under strict circumstances, and mostly seen as an 
afterthought. 2 This was even though an injunction may have far-reaching consequences, 
both on individuals and the community at large. The fact that an activity contributed to the 
community was perceived as irrelevant, potentially leaving society as a whole worse off 
after an injunction was awarded. 
 
The UK Supreme Court ushered in a new approach that takes account of all considerations. 
However, it is yet to be seen what approach the New Zealand courts will take. This essay 
examines the law in New Zealand and abroad. It argues that New Zealand will follow the 
UK Supreme Court, and proposes a framework that should be used to inform the decision 
that a court will make on whether to grant damages in lieu. Finally, the potential quantum 
of a damages in lieu award is discussed. 
 
II Damages in lieu of an injunction 
As noted by Blanchard above, the remedy can be just as important as liability itself. There 
is a range of remedies available to the plaintiff. A court may issue an injunction to stop a 
continuing wrong, or award damages in lieu to compensate for a future wrong occurring.3 
 
  
1 Peter Blanchard (ed) Civil Remedies in New Zealand (2nd ed, Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2011). 
2 Lawrence v Fen Tigers [2014] UKSC 13, [2014] AC 822, [2014] 2 WLR 433. Formerly referred to as 
Coventry v Lawrence. 
3 Judicature Act 1908, s 16A. 
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Legal damages under tort aim to put a person in the same position as if the wrong had not 
occurred.4 An injunction aims to prevent future wrongs. By awarding damages in lieu of 
the injunction, the High Court compensates the plaintiff for future harm. This is 
fundamentally different to legal damages.  As such, these damages are categorised as 
'equitable damages'. Equitable damages are awarded in certain circumstances where legal 
damages are inappropriate or inadequate. These damages do not follow the same formulaic 
approach of legal damages. Damages in lieu is one of the main areas where equitable 
damages are awarded.5 
 
The basic structure of awarding damages in lieu of an injunction under s 16A of the 
Judicature Act 19086 is stated in Cockburn v CS Development.7 Although the 
considerations around awarding damages in lieu and damages in lieu of specific 
performance are fundamentally different, the exercise of discretion follows a uniform 
process. Section 16A requires:8 
 
1) Jurisdiction to obtain specific performance or an injunction; and 
2) As the award is discretionary, the court must decide whether the case is 
appropriate for damages in lieu. 
 
The main question around awarding damages in lieu revolves around the courts' discretion. 
 
  
4 Geoff McLay & David Neild "Torts" in Peter Blanchard (ed) Civil Remedies in New Zealand (2nd ed, 
Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2011) at 91. 
5 ICF Spry The Principles of Equitable Remedies (9th ed, Lawbook Co, Sydney, 2014), at 650. 
6 The Judicature Modernisation Bill 2013 (178-2) is awaiting its third reading at the time of writing. If passed, 
it will repeal the Judicature Act 1908 and replace it with a new Senior Courts Act. Clause 12 is the equivalent 
provision, and although the wording is changed, there is no substantive change to the discretion. Also see J 
C Williamson Ltd v Lukey [1931] VLR 221 (HCA) for authority that a wording change does not change the 
discretion to award damages in lieu. 
7 Cockburn v CS Development No 2 Ltd [2013] NZCA 78. 
8 Adapted from [26]. 
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III Origin of the discretion 
The law around damages in lieu has a historical basis in the separation of Common Law 
and Equity. As Wilde noted, problems arose for those who sought compensation for past 
harm as well as prevention of future harm.9 A Common Law court could compensate for 
past harms, but could not stop ongoing harm. The Chancery could award the equitable 
remedy of an injunction, but if this argument was rejected, the court could not award 
compensation. This led to unfair results.10 
 
For this reason, the Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (known as Lord Cairns' Act) became 
law.11 Section 2 allowed for damages to be given in substitution of, or in addition to, an 
injunction (or specific performance).12 Procedurally, this was superfluous after the merging 
of the courts in 1873.13 Lord Cairns' Act was repealed in 1883.14 Despite the repeal, the 
use of the discretion continued. The existence of the discretion in law was confirmed in 
Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack (Leeds).15 
 
Ryder v Hall (Ryder) imported this discretion into New Zealand.16 This was an appeal from 
a judgment giving nominal damages for the blocking of a waterway. The Court affirmed 
the discretion of the Supreme Court (now High Court) to award damages in lieu. However, 
it did not conclude on the method of importation of the power. Stout CJ stated that a 
statutory basis was unnecessary due to the fusion of law and equity,17 while Edwards J 
reasoned that the authority came from the Supreme Court Act 1860 which gave equitable 
and common law jurisdiction to the Supreme Court.18 Following cases have tended to quote 
  
9 Mark Wilde "Nuisance Law and Damages in Lieu of an Injunction: Challenging the Orthodoxy of the 
Shelfer Criteria" in Stephen Pitel, Jason Neyers, and Erika Chamberlain (eds) Tort Law: Challenging 
Orthodoxy (Hart Publishing, Portland (OR), 2013) at 357. 
10 At 357. 
11 Chancery Amendment Act 1858 (UK) 21 & 22 Vict c 27. 
12 Section 2. 
13 Supreme Court of Judicature Act 1873 (UK) 36 & 37 Vict c 66. 
14 Statute Law Revision and Civil Procedure Act 1883 (UK) 46 & 47 Vict c 49. 
15 [1924] AC 851 at 863. 
16 Ryder v Hall (1908) 27 NZLR 385 (CA). 
17 At 411. 
18 At 424. 
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Ryder as authority for the discretion, rather than to resolve this disagreement of origin.19 
The discretion was ultimately codified.20 
 
Lord Cairns' Act granted more than just procedural powers. In Isenberg v East India House 
Estate Ltd (Isenberg), the Court held that Lord Cairns' Act gave a discretion to choose 
between remedies.21 From that moment, the current law around the judicial discretion to 
award damages in lieu was formed, and the courts have grappled with how to control it. 
 
IV Shelfer and the discretion before Fen Tigers 
A The test from Shelfer 
Before the UK Supreme Court clarified the law in Lawrence v Fen Tigers (Fen Tigers),22 
the authority around the use of the discretion (both in the United Kingdom and New 
Zealand) was Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Company (Shelfer).23  
 
Electricity generators, through noise and vibrations, caused physical damage and an 
interference in the use and enjoyment of Shelfer's public house. The lower court found that 
there was a nuisance, but held that Shelfer was entitled to damages in lieu. The Court of 
Appeal overturned this ruling. Lindley LJ refused to accept that Lord Cairns' Act had turned 
the Court into a "tribunal for legalizing wrongful acts", arguing that it ought not to allow a 
wrong to occur simply because the wrongdoer was willing to pay for it.24 The fact that the 
wrongdoer was a public benefactor was irrelevant.25 
 
  
19 Geoff McLay "Equitable Damages" in Peter Blanchard (ed) Civil Remedies in New Zealand (2nd ed, 
Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2011) at 196. 
20 Judicature Act 1908, s 16A. 
21 Isenberg v East India House Estate Co (1863) 3 De GJ & S 263, 46 ER 637 (Ch). 
22 Lawrence v Fen Tigers, above n 2. 
23 Shelfer v City of London Electric Lighting Company [1895] 1 Ch 287 (CA). 
24 At 315-316. 
25 At 316. 
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The most influential statement of law came from AL Smith LJ. The four step "working 
rule" stood as the cornerstone of the discretion for over a century. It stated that: 26 
 
1) If the injury to the plaintiff’s legal rights is small 
2) And is one which is capable of being estimated in money 
3) And is one which can be adequately compensated by a small money payment 
4) And the case is one in which it would be oppressive to the defendant to grant an injunction 
- then damages in substitution for an injunction may be given. 
 
Each limb of this test was to be decided upon its own facts.27 This working rule was not 
intended to be exhaustive, but it came to be seen as the definitive law in some jurisdictions. 
B UK Authority 
The UK position forms the authority that New Zealand courts have tended to follow.28 The 
first case of note is Leeds.29 The plaintiff brought an action due to a threatened obstruction 
to ancient lights. A quia timet injunction (for an imminent threat not commenced) was 
sought. It was held that damages in lieu could be awarded, and the quantum was calculated 
with reference to the future harm to the party.30  
  
Lord Denning was a major proponent of awarding damages in lieu for public utility 
reasons. In Miller v Jackson (Miller), a claim of nuisance was brought against a cricket 
club by a neighbouring family tired of cricket balls being hit into their property. 31 The 
property was newly developed, with the land previously being used for farming. The Court 
established (Lord Denning dissenting) liability under nuisance, but by a different majority 
(including Lord Denning), the Court held that damages should be awarded in lieu. In 
  
26 At 322-323. 
27 At 323. 
28 This essay is a brief summation of what is a rich history. For a more detailed historical account, see JA 
Jolowicz "Damages in Equity – A Study of Lord Cairns' Act" (1975) 34 CLJ 224. For a modern account, see 
Lawrence v Fen Tigers, above n 2. 
29 Leeds Industrial Co-operative Society Ltd v Slack, above n 15. 
30 At 859. 
31 [1977] QB 966 (CA). 
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particular focus was the public interest in the continuation of the cricket grounds,32 as well 
as the hostility shown by the plaintiff towards the cricket club.33 
 
In Kennaway v Thompson (Kennaway), the Court of Appeal rejected the idea of public 
interests overcoming private interests.34 Motor boat racing had caused a nuisance to the 
plaintiff's property. Lawton LJ refused to apply Miller, and instead moved back to a pure 
Shelfer analysis.35 The Court held that it could factor the public interest into the form of 
the injunction, but not whether an injunction should be awarded at all.36 
   
The Court of Appeal judgment in Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd (Allen) was a further 
indication of Lord Denning's view.37. In dealing with the finding of a nuisance, Lord 
Denning stated that it may be troubling to stop a beneficial enterprise, but this may be 
overcome by granting damages in lieu.38 
 
On appeal in Allen, this position was not looked upon kindly. Lord Wilberforce stated that 
when a nuisance is established, a plaintiff is entitled to an injunction "subject only to a 
precarious appeal to Lord Cairns' Act".39 This 'precarious' view of the law suggested that 
Lord Wilberforce viewed Kennaway as the correct approach. 
 
In Jaggard v Sawyer (Jaggard), an action was brought in trespass and a restrictive covenant 
on the ability of the defendants to build a dwelling in an adjacent property. The claim 
succeeded, and attention went to remedy. 40 The Court was persuaded by Shelfer, but did 
not apply the test as stringently as other historic cases. Millett LJ noted that it was "only a 
working rule" and not "an exhaustive statement of the circumstances in which damages 
  
32 At 982. 
33 At 989. 
34 Kennaway v Thompson [1981] QB 88 (CA). 
35 At 93. 
36 At 94. 
37 Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1980] QB 156 (CA). 
38 At 169. 
39 Allen v Gulf Oil Refining Ltd [1981] AC 1001 (HL) at 1013. 
40 Jaggard v Sawyer [1995] 1 WLR 269 (CA). 
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may be awarded instead of an injunction."41 The remedy is discretionary, and so no case is 
truly binding on the court's ability to use its discretion.42 The real test is one of oppression 
(the fourth element of the Shelfer test). Finally, it was established that the refusal of 
injunctive relief has the practical effect of licensing a wrong. The court has the ability to 
award damages "once and for all in respect of future damages."43 
 
Recent (pre-Fen Tigers) case law in the UK higher courts has tended to follow Shelfer very 
strictly. The Queens's Bench44 and Court of Appeal45 judgments in Watson v Croft Promo-
Sport Ltd (Watson) show the different perspectives of the discretion that a court may take. 
Watson concerned a motor racing circuit very close to the homes of the plaintiffs. The 
plaintiffs successfully claimed that the noise created by the circuit was a nuisance. In the 
High Court, the remedy was damages in lieu. Simon J stated that "the Shelfer case is not a 
forensic straight-jacket for what is ultimately a matter of judgment and discretion".46 The 
delay, the willingness of the parties to accept damages, the overall public benefit of the 
racing, and the limited range of alternative venues were considered in order to conclude 
that an injunction would not be appropriate.47 This type of analysis would not be out of 
place after Fen Tigers.  
 
The Court of Appeal took a dim view of this approach, holding that, in very marginal cases, 
the public interest could be considered, but that it alone could not negate the oppression 
test that was "clearly required" in cases using this discretion.48 This was a strict return to 
the Shelfer rule, and echoed similar recent case law.49 
  
41 At 287. 
42 At 288.  
43 At 285-286. 
44 [2008] EWHC 759, [2008] 3 ALL ER 1171 (QB). 
45 [2009] EWCA Civ 15 (CA). 
46 Watson v Croft Promo-Sport Ltd (QB), above n 44, at [86]. 
47 At [87]-[88]. 
48 Watson v Croft Promo-Sport Ltd (CA), above n 45, at [51]. 
49 See Regan v Paul Properties Ltd [2006] EWCA Civ 1391, [2007] Ch 135. 
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C New Zealand Authority 
Ryder is authority for the proposition that the Shelfer test is good law in New Zealand.50 
However, as far back as 1940, New Zealand questioned the strictness of the Shelfer test. In 
Eaton v Dalgleish, the Court held that the Shelfer criteria was "not intended to be an 
exhaustive statement of the grounds upon which the Court may exercise its discretion".51 
The Court took into account the actions of both parties,52 as well as the cost to the 
defendant, to conclude that an injunction was warranted.53 
 
In Attorney-General v Abraham and Williams Ltd, the Court rejected an appeal for damages 
in lieu from a stockyard, saying that the public interest was not a ground for refusing an 
injunction.54 In Blakely and Anderson v De Lambert (De Lambert), the Court of Appeal 
attempted to distinguish Shelfer by saying that Shelfer was not applicable in the 
enforcement of negative covenants.55 Disher v Farnworth granted damages in lieu without 
citing Shelfer.56 The Court based its decision on the disproportionate harm in removing 
part of a dwelling, as well as the fact that Mrs Disher was entitled to sue only due to the 
mistakes of other parties.57  
 
Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood (BNZ) is the most notable case regarding damages in 
lieu in New Zealand.58 A custom-built veranda reflected light into neighbouring office 
buildings. With regards to public interest arguments, Hardie Boys J stated that:59 
 
To the extent that this is an appeal to set the public interest ahead of the private 
interests of the plaintiffs, then I regret that authority requires me to close my ears to it.  
  
50 Ryder v Hall, above n 16, at 415-416. 
51 Eaton v Dalgleish [1940] NZLR 702 (HC) at 718. 
52 At 718-719. 
53 At 720. 
54 Attorney-General v Abraham and Williams Ltd [1949] NZLR 461 (CA) at 498. 
55 Blakely and Anderson v De Lambert [1959] NZLR 356 (HC) at 379. 
56 Disher v Farnworth [1993] 3 NZLR 390 (CA). 
57 At 401. 
58 Bank of New Zealand v Greenwood [1984] 1 NZLR 525 (HC). 
59 At 535. 
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The Court also stated that the relative costs between the parties were also irrelevant: "If 
one creates an actionable nuisance, he must eliminate it, whatever the cost."60 The 
possibility of awarding damages in lieu was rejected, rather the order of the court was for 
the defendants to supply blinds to the plaintiffs. This award is curious, as noted by 
Beever.61 He suggested that the award was actually one of damages in lieu (despite Hardie 
Boys J stating otherwise) as it is a provision of money to the plaintiff, as opposed to an 
order to cease the nuisance. On further analysis of the judgment, by stating that "It would 
achieve these results at what is likely to be a much lower cost to the defendants, both in 
terms of money and detrimental effect", the relative costs were also taken into account. 
These statements leave the law from the case in a confused state. 
 
Day v Black is evidence that recent New Zealand courts have not followed Shelfer as 
strictly as in the UK.62 The case centred on a restrictive covenant around the building of a 
house. Rodney Hansen J held that the working rule in Shelfer was relevant but not decisive 
(citing Jaggard).63 The 'hardship' test, formulated by Spry on Equitable Remedies, was to 
be the overriding principle.64 This test is that:65 
 
… only when the hardship caused to the defendant through specific enforcement 
would so far outweigh the hardship caused to the plaintiff if specific enforcement were 
denied that it would be unjust in all the circumstances to do more than to award 
damages. 
 
It should be observed that Spry is very critical of the Shelfer rule, and this test was 
formulated on the premise that Shelfer is not good law. 
 
  
60 At 534. 
61 Alan Beever The Law of Private Nuisance (Hart Publishing, Portland (OR), 2013) at 151. 
62 Day v Black (2004) 6 NZCPR 169 (HC). 
63 At [33]-[34]. 
64 At [34]. 
65 Spry, above n 5, at 665. 
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The Employment Court66 and the Māori Appellate Court67 have cited Shelfer as good 
authority, though neither used the four step test as truly decisive. 
 
To summarise, the New Zealand courts, much like the UK courts, have considered the rule 
in Shelfer to be very persuasive. However, New Zealand courts have also been more likely 
to use it as a working rule, rather than a strict rule. 
 
V Lawrence v Fen Tigers 
A Facts 
Fen Tigers68 is one of the most influential nuisance cases since the turn of the century. The 
facts are similar to both Kennaway69 and Watson70. The defendants had been using the land 
for motorsport since the 1970s, when planning permission for the stadium was granted. In 
2006, the plaintiffs bought and inhabited nearby housing. Immediately, they took action 
against the noise, first by a complaint to the council, followed by an action in private 
nuisance. 
B The Shelfer Test and the Legal Burden 
Fen Tigers represented a clear shift in the place of the Shelfer criteria in UK law. Lord 
Neuberger summarised the shift by stating:71 
 
The court’s power to award damages in lieu of an injunction involves a classic exercise 
of discretion, which should not, as a matter of principle, be fettered … as a matter of 
practical fairness, each case is likely to be so fact-sensitive that any firm guidance is 
likely to do more harm than good. 
 
  
66 Cox v Pae EmpC Wellington WEC13/97, 26 March 1997 at 25-26. 
67 Te Hokowhitu v Proprietors of Matauri X - Matauri X (2010) 2010 Maori Appellate Court MB 566. 
68 Lawrence v Fen Tigers, above n 2. 
69 Kennaway v Thompson, above n 34. 
70 Watson v Promo-sport Ltd, above n 44 and n 45. 
71 Lawrence v Fen Tigers, above n 2, at [120]. 
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Any mechanical application of the four-step test is to be rejected.72 While technically the 
test remains law, three caveats undermine its significance:73  
 
First, the application of the four tests must not be such as “to be a fetter on the exercise 
of the court’s discretion”. Secondly, it would, in the absence of additional relevant 
circumstances pointing the other way, normally be right to refuse an injunction if 
those four tests were satisfied. Thirdly, the fact that those tests are not all satisfied does 
not mean that an injunction should be granted. 
 
The legal burden, according to Lord Neuberger, remains with the defendant to show that 
damages should be awarded in lieu. The prima facie position in the law is an injunction.74 
 
According to these caveats, the Shelfer criteria should be applied at the initial stages of the 
remedy question. If the Shelfer test is not satisfied, the legal burden remains on the 
defendant to prove that damages in lieu would be more suitable. If the Shelfer test is 
fulfilled, an evidentiary burden shifts. The plaintiff must raise additional relevant 
circumstances that suggest an injunction is more suitable. This is not to fetter the court's 
discretion, as the court may depart from this if the circumstances require it. 
 
Lord Sumption went further in reforming the area, by saying that "damages are ordinarily 
an adequate remedy" and that there should be a presumption against an injunction where 
conflicted interests are engaged.75 This reflects the need for damages to be treated as an 
acceptable remedy, but it goes too far. By the time a remedy is discussed, a right has been 
breached (through the establishment of liability), so an injunction should be given unless 
it can be shown that damages would be more beneficial to society as a whole. The majority 
disagreed with Lord Sumption's proposition.76 
  
72 At [119]. 
73 At [123]. 
74 At [121]. 
75 At [161]. 
76 For example, see Lord Mance at [168]. 
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C Public Interest 
The public interest has always been a debatable consideration in damages in lieu, as well 
as the law of nuisance more generally. The position taken by the Supreme Court is ground-
breaking, but not completely innovative. Already mentioned are the cases of Miller, 
Kennaway, and Watson which all take opposing views. 
 
Dennis v Ministry of Defence (Dennis) is an example where the Court took into account 
the public interest in making a decision.77 The noise from RAF jets created a nuisance for 
the neighbours. When it came to award, the Court took into account arguments around the 
'defence of the realm'. It concluded that:78 
 
… where there is a real public interest in a particular use of land, I can see no objection 
in principle to taking that public interest into account, in one way or another, in 
deciding what is best to be done. 
 
An analogy was drawn with the defence of statutory authority, which was also seen to 
consider the public interest.79 Beever has been critical of this view: the basis of statutory 
authority was the statute itself rather than the public interest attached to it.80 
  
Fen Tigers sided with Miller, Dennis and Watson (QB) to say that public interest 
considerations are relevant to remedy. Lord Neuberger cast the net of possible public 
interest wide, saying:81 
 
… of public interest, I find it hard to see how there could be any circumstances in 
which it arose and could not, as a matter of law, be a relevant factor. 
 
  
77 Dennis v Ministry of Defence [2003] EWHC 793, [2003] Env LR 34 (QB). 
78 At [45]. 
79 At [45]. 
80 Beever, above n 61, at 149. 
81 Lawrence v Fen Tigers, above n 2, at [124]. 
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The loss of the employees' livelihoods, as well as the number of neighbours affected by the 
nuisance, were given as examples of relevant factors. Lord Neuberger criticised the Court 
of Appeal in Watson for its view on the public interest. In principle, it was "very strange" 
to relegate the public interest to marginal cases, as it should either be relevant or not 
relevant at all.82 
 
The rest of the Court agreed with this result, bar two differences of opinion. Lord Mance 
hesitated on the idea of the public interest outweighing the private (and that compensation 
would be an adequate remedy) as "the right to enjoy one’s home without disturbance is one 
… people value for reasons largely if not entirely independent of money." Lord Sumption 
criticised the "unduly moralistic approach to disputes".83 By moving the legal burden of 
proof, Lord Sumption would allow a greater scope of public interest arguments. 
 
On the whole, Lord Neuberger's approach is the most persuasive. Lord Mance raised a 
valuable point around the right of enjoyment, but this is unlikely to be forgotten in a 
jurisdiction that, for over a century, regarded this consideration as close to determinative. 
Lord Sumption went too far when putting the public interest ahead of the private. Lord 
Neuberger's approach allows for a practical assessment of all the circumstances around a 
case, without favouring one true approach. This is appropriate for a jurisdiction which will 
face an unlimited variety of circumstances. 
D Planning Permission 
Planning permission and nuisance law occupy a similar position in the law, both in New 
Zealand and abroad. Both regulate the rights of parties compared to those in the 
community. However, the overlap between the two has caused problems. It is an anomaly 
in the law that a party has to go through the regulatory process of approving an activity, 
and yet still be beholden to nuisance law. For a layperson, it is a confusing situation, and 
for a person versed in resource management law, it is not much clearer. 
 
  
82 At [118]. 
83 At [160]. 
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Although this essay focuses on remedy, it is important to note the movement of the law in 
terms of liability.84 In summary, planning permission is not a defence to an allegation of 
nuisance (unless it amounts to statutory authority) but it may be evidence as to what is 
reasonable in the area,85 or, in exceptional cases, it can lead to changing the character of 
the neighbourhood.86 
 
Planning permission plays a more definitive role in the remedy. As quoted by Lord 
Carnwath: "The continued strength of private nuisance in a regulatory state probably 
depends on a more flexible approach to remedies".87 As noted by Howarth, the Law Lords 
were influenced by the 'hole' in planning law, where private rights could be breached 
without compensation.88 
 
The majority in Fen Tigers was persuaded by the usefulness of planning permission in 
cases of nuisance, but not to the point that they were determinative. An award of planning 
permission "may provide strong support for the contention that the activity is of benefit to 
the public".89 The view of the majority suggested a spectrum of planning permissions. 
Where the public benefits have been reasonably considered, and the probability of nuisance 
is clearly identified, the planning permission will have "real force" in persuading the 
court.90 When the permission either does not consider the nuisance, or does not reasonably 
judge the public benefit, it will not be persuasive. However, even the most persuasive 
planning permissions will only be one of many considerations.91 
 
  
84 For more information, see Maria Lee "Private Nuisance in the Supreme Court: Coventry v Lawrence" 
[2014] JPL 705. For a New Zealand perspective, see Quentin Davies and David Neild "Nuisance and resource 
management" [2014] NZLJ 250. 
85 Lawrence v Fen Tigers, above n 2, at [96]. 
86 At [223]. 
87 At [240]. 
88 David Howarth "Noise and Nuisance" [2014] CLJ 247 at 249. 
89 Lawrence v Fen Tigers, above n 2, at [125]. 
90 At [125]. 
91 At [125]. 
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Lord Sumption, on the other hand, saw the award of planning permission as determinative. 
Under this view, public interest evaluations should be left to planning bodies.92 As a matter 
of principle, an injunction should not be granted in cases where planning permission has 
contemplated the use of land that is being challenged.93 This approach is seemingly based 
on the concern around the overlapping jurisdictions. Lord Carnwath rejected this approach, 
saying that planning permissions "differ so much as to make it unwise as to lay down any 
general propositions."94 
 
VI Other Considerations 
A The Canadian Approach 
 The Canadian courts, formerly willing to show flexibility in awarding damages in lieu, 
have moved towards an approach based on Shelfer. 
 
In Black v Canadian Copper Co, the Court sided with a factory over farmers, pointing to 
the position of importance of the factory in the city, and stating "there are circumstances in 
which it is impossible for the individual to assert his individual rights as to inflict a 
substantial injury upon the whole community."95 However, in Canadian Paper Company 
v Brown, a case with similar considerations, the Supreme Court put greater emphasis on 
the private rights of the plaintiff, and it was held that the benefit to the community could 
not subsume the plaintiff's rights.96 The Court was split as to whether public interest 
considerations should be taken into account at all.97  
 
In Duchman v Oakland Dairy Co (Duchman), the Shelfer rule was "unhesitatingly 
followed" by the majority.98 It held that the Canadian courts were not "more free", but 
  
92 At [158]. 
93 At [161]. 
94 At [246]. 
95 Black v Canadian Copper Co (1917) 12 OWN 243 (SC). 
96 Canadian Paper Company v Brown (1922) 63 SCR 248. 
97 At [15]-[19], Idington J rejected any idea that the plaintiff's rights may be bought due to public interest 
concerns. At [36], Duff J rejected the argument that public interest considerations are irrelevant. 
98 Duchman v Oakland Dairy Co [1929] 1 DLR 9 (ONCA), as per Middleton JA. 
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rather had the same strict principles as the UK courts.99  This was not followed in Bottom 
v Ontario Leaf Tobacco, where the 200 jobs that would be lost with the granting of an 
injunction were said to outweigh the harm caused to the plaintiff. 100 The ultimate test was 
to balance the advantages and disadvantages of an injunction,101 an approach consistent 
with modern principles. 
 
Walker v Pioneer Construction Co resolved this conflict in the case law.102 Duchman was 
cited as the defining authority in the area,103 and other public interest cases mentioned were 
narrowed as exceptional cases of "widespread public hardship".104 The Shelfer test was 
strictly applied.105 Recent cases have cited this as authority.106 Leading Canadian texts still 
refer to Shelfer as the guiding authority.107 
B United States Authority 
The United States has taken a much wider view of awarding damages in lieu. In the Second 
Restatement of Torts, at § 936, a range of factors are considered in the appropriateness of 
awarding an injunction:108  
 
(a) the nature of the interest to be protected, 
(b) the relative adequacy to the plaintiff of injunction and of other remedies, 
(c) any unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in bringing suit, 
(d) any related misconduct on the part of the plaintiff, 
(e) the relative hardship likely to result to defendant if an injunction is granted and to 
plaintiff if it is denied, 
  
99 As per Middleton JA. 
100 Bottom v Ontario Leaf Tobacco [1935] OR 205 (CA). 
101 At [15]. 
102 Walker v Pioneer Construction Co (1975) 8 OR (2d) 35 (SC). 
103 At [50]. 
104 At [51]. 
105 At [52]. 
106 Such as Balmain Hotel Group LP v 1547648 Ontario Ltd (2009) 60 MPLR (4th) 262 (SC). 
107 See Lewis Klar Tort Law (4th ed, Thompson Carswell, Toronto, 2008); Allen Linden and Bruce Feldthusen 
Canadian Tort Law (8th ed, Canada, 2006). 
108 American Law Institute Restatement of The Law - Torts (2nd ed, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, 1979) § 936. 
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(f) the interests of third persons and of the public, and 
(g) the practicability of framing and enforcing the order or judgment. 
 
This is often framed as a utility versus gravity of harm balance.109 The approach is most 
commonly explained with reference to Boomer v Atlantic Cement Company (Boomer).110 
Boomer involved a factory that polluted a nearby residence, but had cost $45 million to 
create, and also employed more than 300 people. The Court held that the utility of the jobs 
and the harm to the defendant by granting an injunction far outweighed the harm to the 
plaintiff. The public interest has also been considered in sewage systems,111 generic 
drugs,112 sporting contracts,113 and water use,114 showing that there is no limit to the 
consideration of the public interest in this jurisdiction. 
 
This is a rich body of law with many different considerations, mostly consistent with the 
position of the law after Fen Tigers. It should be observed that, while Commonwealth 
jurisdictions tend to favour awarding an injunction more than the United States, the US 
jurisdiction is still persuasive, due to the range of circumstances it has analysed. 
C Law and Economics 
The idea of damages in lieu of an injunction is a mainstay in the field of law and economics. 
The idea of a stereotypical nuisance (polluter and resident) has been the subject of many 
experiments in the area.115 
 
The foundational paper in this analysis is "The Problem of Social Cost" by Ronald 
Coase.116 It suggested that, in cases of externalities (such as nuisance), the allocation of 
property does not matter as bargaining will lead to an efficient outcome. The party who 
  
109 Rebel v Big Tarkio Drainage Dist 602 SW 2d 787 (MO 1980). 
110 257 NE 2d 870 (1970). 
111 Krebiozen Research Fdn v Beacon Press Inc 334 Mass 86, 134 NE 2d 1 (1956). 
112 Pennwalt Corp v Zenith Labs Inc 472 FSupp 413 (ED Mich 1979). 
113 Cincinnati Bengals Inc v Bergey 453 FSupp 129 (SD Ohio 1974). 
114 Wasserburger v Coffee 180 Neb 149, 141 NW 2d 738 (1966). 
115 See Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen Law & Economics (5th ed, Pearson Education, Boston, MA, 2008). 
116 RH Coase "The Problem of Social Cost" (1960) 3 JLE 1. 
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values the rights the most will pay the most to secure them, and so rights will be transferred 
until there is no one more willing than the owner to possess those rights. This is widely 
known as the "Coase theorem". This assumes no transaction costs (the costs of bargaining), 
which in reality can be very high in cases involving potential nuisances. Coase noted this, 
and suggested that a different property right allocation system should be used to combat 
the high transaction costs of an injunction.117 This is often cited in support of a wider ability 
to award damages in lieu.118 
 
This theorem was built upon by Calabresi and Melamed, where a polluter/resident model 
was used to create four 'rules' around the remedies to a nuisance:119  
1) An award of an injunction 
2) An award where damages are awarded in lieu of an injunction 
3) The pollution is not a nuisance 
4) The pollution may continue unless the resident pays damages 
These are awarded according to the levels of transaction costs, and the party who can 
reduce the cost the most efficiently. An injunction is awarded where the transaction costs 
are low and the polluter is more able to reduce the pollution. Likewise, if transaction costs 
are low and the resident is more able to avoid the pollution, there will be a finding of no 
nuisance. These are cases where the Coase theorem is appropriate. Under rule one for 
example, if the polluter values pollution more than the resident values clean air, a 
settlement could be bargained for. Rule three applies to a high transaction cost situation 
where the polluter is in a better position to reduce the pollution, and rule four applies in the 
same situation but with the resident in a better position. It should be observed that this 
model applies solely to economic efficiency, and the authors do not factor in distributional 
effects.120 
 
  
117 At 851. 
118 Wilde, above n 9, at 387. 
119 Guido Calabresi and A Douglas Melamed "Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View 
of the Cathedral" (1972) 85 Harv L Rev 1089. 
120 At 1118. 
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All of these rules have been applied in litigation. While rules one, two and three are typical 
in nuisance litigation, rule four is rarely applied. However, in the United States case of Spur 
Industries v Del E Webb Development (Spur Industries), the Court awarded an injunction, 
but also awarded damages to the defendant to indemnify the cost of moving (a rule 4 
situation).121 The court was influenced by the fact that the developers had consciously 
developed this area for residential housing before selling it on to the residents of the 
development, causing the activity to become a nuisance where it had not been before. 
 
The New Zealand (and UK) courts are unlikely to allow this award to occur. First, s 16A 
only allows for damages "in addition to, or substitution for" an injunction, whereas Spur 
Industries granted it as compensation for an injunction.122  Secondly, if the defence of 
coming to the nuisance is accepted by New Zealand courts, it would likely apply to this 
situation.123 The Court in Spur Industries held that the defence could not apply as the 
purchasers of the property were third parties. This would be unlikely to be accepted in New 
Zealand. The third parties purchased the land off developers who 'came to the nuisance'. It 
would be an anomaly in nuisance law if this possible defence could be defeated by on-
selling the property. A more fundamental point is that New Zealand law has been much 
more protective of individual rights. A jurisdiction based on the Shelfer idea of not 
legalising wrongful acts is unlikely to allow an award that effectively gifts the other party 
the rights in question before selling those rights back. For these reasons, a 'rule four' award 
is unlikely to be applied in New Zealand.  
 
It is often assumed that the high transaction costs associated with court action lead to the 
conclusion that an award of damages may be more efficient than an injunction. There is 
great concern that an injunction will allow the plaintiff to extort the defendant. This concern 
  
121 Spur Industries v Del E Webb Development 494 P 2d 700 (AZ, 1972). 
122 Judicature Act 1908, s 16A. 
123 As a general rule, it is no defence that the plaintiff came to the nuisance (see Sturges v Bridgman (1879) 
11 Ch D 852 (CA)). However, Lord Neuberger in Lawrence v Fen Tigers, above n 2, suggested, in obiter, 
that an exception may exist (at [56]) in restricted circumstances where the plaintiff changed the use of the 
land. It is not yet known if this defence will be accepted in New Zealand. 
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was summarised in Isenberg, with the suggestion that, by granting an injunction, the Court 
would be delivering the Defendant to the Plaintiff bound hand and foot.124 
 
This assumption has been recently challenged by Pontin in a contextual study of historical 
injunctions.125 The study concluded that the Shelfer criteria have been broadly successful 
in doing justice, often due to the suspension of injunctions until a later date, or allowing an 
activity up to a specified level.126 The extortion may be an academic concern, rather than 
a problem in practice. However, other studies have tended to be inconclusive on this point. 
In the case of externalities, Kaplow and Shavell found that, where bargaining had 
completely broken down, a liability rule (damages in lieu) was preferable to a property rule 
(an injunction).127 Where bargaining was possible, the results were inconclusive. With 
takings, the situation was different, and a property rule was preferable. These two different 
studies show the need for a case-by-case approach to remedy. 
 
Cooter and Ulen pointed to the 'error cost' in awarding damages in lieu.128 The actual cost 
of future damage cannot be estimated with certainty, which must be factored into any 
award.  An injunction is certain, so may be preferable in this regard. 
 
Boomer acknowledged the changing of incentives after a grant of permanent damages.129 
Jasen J (dissenting) suggested that granting of damages in lieu would result in there being 
no incentive to abate the nuisance.130 Bergan J, for the majority, stated that the factory had 
already tried to mitigate the pollution, and it was unlikely that more could be done.131 The 
fact that the parties could negotiate a settlement without mitigation also spoke against the 
  
124 Isenberg v East India House Estate Ltd, above n 21, at 641. 
125 Ben Pontin Nuisance Law and Environmental Protection (Lawtext publishing, Whitney, UK, 2013). 
126 Ben Pontin "Nuisance injunctions after Coventry v Lawrence: revisiting the question of 'prevention or 
payment'?" (2013) 25 ELM 209. 
127 Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell "Property Rules versus Liability Rules: An Economic Analysis"(1996) 
109 Harv L Rev 713. 
128 Cooter and Ulen, above n 115, at 177. 
129 Boomer v Atlantic Cement Company, above n 110. 
130 At 876. 
131 At 873. 
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injunction.132 The possible incentives around a grant of damages deserve great 
consideration, as mitigation of the offending action is likely to be of some value. 
  
VII Applicability of Fen Tigers to a New Zealand context 
A The Shelfer test 
New Zealand is already roughly in line with Fen Tigers regarding the applicability of the 
Shelfer test. Rotherham noted that the test is yet to be accepted into New Zealand law.133  
This position is incorrect in the strictest sense, as decisions have been based around the 
four-step test.134 It is more likely that Rotherham was indicating that the courts are not 
bound as strictly as in the United Kingdom, a statement that is consistent with authority. 
The courts are still likely to retain the Shelfer test as a working rule. This is due to the 
importance that past case law has put on the test, and reflects the fact that it still remains a 
good guide to where damages in lieu are suitable, barring other considerations. As such, 
New Zealand is likely to accept Fen Tigers as the authority in the area. 
 
B Public Interest 
The unambiguous words of Hardie Boys J in BNZ were a clear indication that the courts, 
at the time, did not favour factoring in the public interest. However, this mirrors the English 
position before Fen Tigers. Watson, although allowing for a marginal consideration of the 
public interest, did not entertain the proposition that it could be of general use.135 
 
New Zealand academics are mixed as to the position of the public interest. McLay noted 
that "flexibility is more desirable than dogma" and that, especially in the case of mandatory 
injunctions (injunctions requiring the defendant to take a positive action), the public 
interest should play a part. However, it was harder to argue that public interest should play 
  
132 At 873. 
133 Craig Rotherham "The allocation of remedies in private nuisance: an evaluation of the judicial approach 
to awarding damages in lieu of an injunction" (1989) 4 Canta LR 185 at 197. 
134 For example, see Ryder v Hall, above n 16; Ellis v Rasmussen (1910) 30 NZLR 316 (CA). 
135 Watson v Croft Promo-Sport Ltd (CA), above n 45. 
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a part in other actions.136 Beever was strictly against the consideration, saying that the 
ability for the public to supersede private rights is unjust.137 Both Rotherham138 and 
Stewart139 were broadly in agreement with public interest considerations. 
 
In this author's view, public utility arguments are a welcome addition to the law, so long as 
they are tempered. Injunctions have a vital role in reinforcing rights. However, an 
injunction can have detrimental effects to the economy as a whole, and it is an anomaly 
that this effect cannot be considered. A structured approach to liability, and a flexible 
approach to remedy, is a much-needed compromise between these two values. An award 
of an injunction (or damages in lieu thereof) should be a balance between private rights 
and the public interest, as it can equally affect both. The nuanced approach by Lord 
Neuberger allows for this, and should be adopted in New Zealand. 
C Planning Permission 
According to Besier, the tort of nuisance is becoming redundant in the face of planning 
laws.140 Although the Resource Management Act does not affect liability under 
nuisance,141 many concepts such as "reverse sensitivity" may change the liability of a 
person.142 Furthermore, enforcement techniques reduce reliance on the common law.143  
 
A flexible approach towards planning permissions in cases of nuisances (and other torts) 
will allow for a more coherent legal structure. Awarding damages in lieu will allow for the 
recognition of property rights without going against the resource consent that allowed the 
  
136 McLay, above n 19, at 3.9.4(4). 
137 Beever, above n 61, at 148. 
138 Rotherham, above n 133, at 200. 
139 Isaac Stewart "Reverse Sensitivity: An Environmental Concept to Avoid the Undesirable Effects of 
Nuisance Remedies" (2006) 12 Canta LR 1. 
140 Antoinette Besier, "Leaving at all to the Resource Management Act 1991: The Demise of the Tort of 
Private Nuisance" (2004) 35 VUWLR 563 at 590. 
141 Resource Management Act 1993, s 23. 
142 For more information, see Besier, above n 139, and Stewart, above n 138. 
143 Besier, above n 144. 
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tortious activity. It avoids the pitfalls of statutory authority (as it allows for recognition of 
rights without compensation) while not overriding resource consents. 
 
Resources consents are not granted with an omniscient view over all circumstances. If a 
resource consent has considered all the circumstances around the nuisance, it should be 
given a lot of deference. As noted by Lord Sumption, the planning board is in a better 
position than the courts to weigh up the different interests. However, it should never be 
determinative, as it is unlikely that a resource consent can capture the full picture in any 
circumstance. 
 
VIII Considerations in the New Zealand Context 
This essay proposes a list of non-exclusive criteria designed to inform, rather than fetter, 
the discretion to award damages in lieu. They are relevant after the Shelfer criteria have 
been applied. Cases following Fen Tigers have favoured this multifaceted approach.144 
A Form of the Injunction 
Both mandatory restorative injunctions and preventative injunctions are awarded according 
to the same principles.145 However, as noted by Barker, mandatory restorative injunctions 
are less readily made due to considerations around hardship, conduct, and compliance.146 
Both a mandatory and a preventative injunction may be set aside under the court's 
discretion. However, in principle, enforcing a positive act puts a greater burden on the 
defendant than a negative duty to refrain from an action. As such, damages in lieu will 
more likely be awarded where the injunction is mandatory. 
  
144 See Comic Enterprises Limited v Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation [2014] EWHC 2286 (Ch), at 
[15]; Prophet Plc v Huggett [2014] EWHC 615 (Ch). 
145 However, the court will be less willing to make an award of an quia timet mandatory injunction: see 
Redland Bricks Ltd v Morris [1970] AC 652 (HL). 
146 Andrew Barker "Permanent Injunctions" in Peter Blanchard (ed) Civil Remedies in New Zealand (2nd ed, 
Brookers Ltd, Wellington, 2011) at 236. 
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B Public Interest in the Activity and in the Injunction 
The public interest should form part of the considerations. This should not simply be 
limited to looking at the activity itself. There are almost unlimited possibilities on what 
public interest could be. Classic examples, as given in Fen Tigers, are employment and 
widespread harm.147 The public interest is not limited to arguments about society at large. 
Although there may be a social benefit to an activity, private property rights themselves 
have a public benefit worth protecting. 
C Planning Permission 
A spectrum analysis of planning permissions allows for the diversity of situations that can 
arise. Where a permission encompasses the situation in question, a court should be reluctant 
to stray from it, noting Lord Sumption's concerns around the ability of the court to judge 
the public interest.148 Where the planning permission deals with situations different to those 
arising in the litigation, it should be considered cautiously, and only to the extent that 
relevant issues are analysed.  
D Relative Hardship for the Plaintiff or Defendant 
A consideration of the relative hardships is a key consideration in the Shelfer test, and it is 
likely to continue to guide the discretion. The 'oppression' test in Shelfer and Jaggard 
involves a fundamental look at the harm to the defendant, and to a lesser extent the plaintiff. 
In New Zealand, this balance of hardships has been fully adopted by Day v Black,149 and 
although the test should not be decisive, it should continue to inform the judgment of the 
courts. Attached to this consideration is the likelihood that the offending action will reoccur 
and cause harm. Prophet Plc v Huggett involved a restrictive covenant in an employment 
contract, in a case heard after Fen Tigers was decided.150 The likelihood of confidential 
information being leaked, and the possible harm from a leak, led to the injunction being 
upheld.151 
  
147 Lawrence v Fen Tigers, above n 2, at [124]. 
148 At [158]. 
149 Day v Black, above n 62. 
150 Prophet Plc v Huggett, above n 143. 
151 At [45]. 
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E Conduct of the Parties 
The award of an injunction, as well as damages in lieu of the award, are equitable remedies. 
As such, laches, acquiescence, or other breaches of equitable principles by either party are 
relevant to the remedy.152 Deliberate wrongdoing by the defendant may justify an award 
of an injunction.153 Courts are reluctant to sanction deliberate wrongdoing by either 
party,154 and will also try and combat "gold-digging in respect of unimportant rights."155 
Conversely, in Jaggard, the fact that the defendants had acted in good faith was a factor in 
the Court awarding damages.156 A party cannot complain of hardship caused by a previous 
agreement, if that hardship was foreseeable at the time the agreement was entered into.157 
 
Coming to the nuisance may also play a role in awarding damages in lieu. If a plaintiff 
came to the land knowing that it was subject to a nuisance, and this was reflected in the 
purchase price paid, then an award of damages in lieu may be appropriate. To award an 
injunction would allow a situation tantamount to double recovery, as the purchaser would 
gain a nuisance-free property for the cost of a property subject to the nuisance. 158 
F Possibility of Abatement 
An award of damages removes the incentive to abate the harm. If the action could be easily 
abated, an injunction will be preferred. If the activity is difficult to abate, damages should 
be awarded. Various factors to consider include the cost of mitigation, the level of 
technology (both current and in the foreseeable future), and the level of mitigation already 
attempted.  
  
152 Shaw v Applegate [1977] 1 WLR 970 (CA). 
153 William Sindell plc v Cambridgeshire CC [1994] 1 WLR 1016 (CA). 
154 McLay, above n 19, at 3.9.3(3). 
155 RP Meagher, JD Heydon and MJ Leeming Equity: Doctrines and Remedies (4th ed, Butterworths 
LexisNexis, Australia, 2002) at [23-055]. 
156 Jaggard v Sawyer, above n 40, at 288-289. 
157 See Prophet Plc v Huggett, above n 143, where the fact that the defendant would lose his job was not 
taken into account, as the covenant specifically restricted his ability to work in the industry.  
158 There would be some gain in the award of damages in lieu, but the net gain would be smaller. The lack of 
an injunctive remedy would diminish the ability to hold out for a higher price, and it would be less disruptive 
to the activity. A lower quantum of damages may also be awarded, to mitigate against this double-counting. 
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G Likelihood of Successful Bargaining 
Studies are divided as to the success of an injunction at promoting bargaining between 
parties. However, most studies tend to agree that damages are more efficient where 
bargaining has completely broken down, whereas an injunction suits parties where 
bargaining is possible. As Pontin notes, the public interest may be served just as well (or 
even more so) if parties come to an amicable solution after the grant of an injunction.159 
Damages should be preferred where bargaining has broken down, but if parties are 
reasonably cooperative, an injunction should be preferred.  
H Practicality of the Remedy 
The practicality of the remedy must be considered. As the Restatement of Torts notes: "If 
drafting and enforcing are found to be impracticable, the injunction should not be 
granted".160 Likewise, an award of damages may come with a high error cost, especially 
where damages are not easily estimated. There are likely to be extremely few cases where 
damages can be estimated easily, but where estimation is largely impossible, an injunction 
may be preferred.161 
 
IX Quantum of Damages 
Once damages in lieu have been awarded, the amount awarded needs to be quantified. The 
Court in Fen Tigers was split as to how damages in lieu should be calculated, but all agreed 
that further argument was needed.162 Lord Neuberger noted that it is arguable that 
"damages should not always be limited to the consequent reduction in value of the 
plaintiff's property".163 Lord Clarke agreed, and suggested that there is no reason in 
principle to differentiate between trespass (in which gain-based damages are allowed) and 
nuisance.164 Lord Carnwath, on the other hand, was more reluctant to consider gain-based 
  
159 Pontin "Nuisance injunctions after Coventry v Lawrence: revisiting the question of 'prevention or 
payment'?", above n 126. 
160 American Law Institute, above n 108, § 943. 
161 For example, see Sunrise Brokers LLP v Rodgers [2014] EWCA Civ 1373; [2015] I.C.R. 272, at [53]. 
162 Lawrence v Fen Tigers, above n 2. 
163 At [128]. 
164 At [173]. 
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approaches, due to the less specific injury, and the large number of potential plaintiffs in a 
nuisance claim.165 
 
Jaggard confirmed the discretion to award damages under Lord Cairns' Act on the basis of 
the 'nominal licence' approach in respect of a restrictive covenant.166 Attorney-General v 
Blake stands for the proposition that, in both tort and contract, there are exceptional 
circumstances where the calculation of damages may be measured by the benefit received 
by the defendant.167  
 
New Zealand has adopted a similar approach with regards to trespass. In Roberts v Rodney 
District Council (Roberts), Barker J affirmed that right of the plaintiff to 'wrongful use' 
damages.168 These damages are prospectively awarded under s 16A.169 The starting point 
of this calculation is the reasonable price which a person would pay for a right to commit 
the activity.170 Other factors, such as the plaintiff's actual loss, the defendant's actual gain, 
and the comparative bargaining power between the parties, can then be factored in. These 
factors will be more significant where there is no readily definable market.171 Waugh v 
Attorney-General approved this approach, although it was partially distinguished as the 
Waughs were also due compensation under the Land Valuation Tribunal.172 Cooper J only 
allowed damages to be granted for the limited period before the compensation was due. 
The case stands for the proposition that wrongful use damages should not allow double-
recovery.173 
 
  
165 At [248]. 
166 Jaggard v Sawyer, above n 40. This approves the approach in Wrotham Park Estate Co v Parkside Homes 
[1974] 1 WLR 798 (QB). 
167 Attorney-General v Blake [2001] 1 AC 268 (HL). 
168 Roberts v Rodney District Council (No 2) [2001] 2 NZLR 402 (HC). 
169 At [20]. 
170 At [31]. 
171 At [31]. 
172 Waugh v Attorney-General (No 2) [2006] 2 NZLR 812 (HC). 
173 At [65]. 
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This type of approach is suitable for all cases where Lord Cairns' Act is invoked. An 
injunction is to protect against the taking of a right. If damages in lieu are awarded, the 
rights have been involuntarily taken, and compensation must address this. This is as true 
of nuisance as it is of a restrictive covenant or trespass. The concerns of Lord Carnwath are 
valid, and favour granting an injunction. If damages are still granted in lieu, a figure may 
be calculated according to the benefits accrued by the defendants and the losses suffered 
by the neighbours. This can be apportioned according to the severity of the infringement. 
Although more difficult, it is not impossible, and justice should not be foregone due to 
difficulties around quantification. 
 
If awarded under s 16A, the Rodney approach of allowing the plaintiff only one type of 
damages is incorrect.174 Under s 16A, damages stand in place of the injunction itself. An 
injunction and compensatory damages may co-exist, so damages in lieu should be awarded 
on top of compensatory damages. For example, in Halsey v Esso Petroleum, an injunction 
did not preclude the plaintiff gaining damages for soiled linen.175 It would not make 
principled sense to say that, if damages in lieu were awarded, the linen could not be 
replaced. The Rodney approach may remove some issues of double-counting in trespass 
cases, but the damages are awarded for two fundamentally different considerations. 
Compensation for future harms should not preclude the ability to recover for past harm. 
 
X Conclusion 
Fen Tigers should (and likely will) be followed in New Zealand. The decision to extend 
the court's discretion is not one that should be taken lightly, but society as a whole will 
benefit. The extension of the discretion to consider a range of circumstances is crucial in 
doing complete justice when determining remedy. However, injunctions should remain the 
default remedy unless proven otherwise. Any other outcome risks the weakening of 
personal rights by allowing the public interest to overcome it. The balance between 
enforcing rights and protecting the public interest is a crucial balance, and one that needs 
to be constantly monitored going forward. 
  
174 Roberts v Rodney District Council, above n 168, at [15]. 
175 Halsey v Esso Petroleum Co Ltd [1961] 1 WLR 683 (QB). 
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